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“People Are Enemies to 
What They Don’t Know” 
Managing Stigma and 
Anti-Muslim Stereotypes 
in a Turkish Community 
Center
Crystal Paul1 and Sarah Becker1
Abstract
In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, anti-
Muslim discourse and sentiment has become pervasive in the West. Using 
a collaborative ethnographic approach, we observe how participants at a 
Turkish Community Center (TCC) cultivate stigma management strategies 
against the cultural backdrop of post-9/11 anti-Muslim stereotypes. In 
our analysis, we use Goffman’s work on stigma and critical race theory 
to explore the socially embedded nature of stigmatization processes for 
Turkish Muslims in a local community center. Our findings reveal how 
aspects of Turkish culture and Islam, together with a structural context 
that facilitates collective stigma management, allow TCC participants to 
effectively manage stigma and combat anti-Muslim stereotypes. Turkish 
participants use the practice of “dialogue” to prioritize secular identity(ies) 
through cultural education, normalize the Muslim self in conversation about 
religion, and embody a gendered presentation of Islam and Turkish culture. 
While facilitating individual and collective resilience for TCC participants 
in the face of stigmatization and pervasive anti-Muslim sentiment, these 
practices also contribute to the reproduction of broader patterns of racial, 
cultural, and gender inequality.
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Introduction
Muslims have long been subject to orientalist discourse, which negatively 
stereotypes them as violent, militaristic, uncivilized, and fanatical (Said 
1979; Saloom 2005). However, fueled by the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade 
Center and propelled by public acts of violence committed by individuals 
touting Islamic fundamentalist ideologies, Islamophobia and anti-Muslim 
stereotypes have reached unprecedented levels in recent years (Johns, 
Schmader, and Lickel 2005; Klandermans, van der Toorn, and van 
Stekelenburg 2008; Panagopoulos 2006; Sirin and Balsano 2007). Muslims, 
particularly those in the United States, therefore experience especially intense 
stigmatization in the modern context (Ayoub 2011; el-Aswad 2013).
Studies illustrating how Muslim Americans manage stigma post-9/11 
are part of a growing body of scholarship on stigmatization processes that 
examines how people experience, resist, challenge, and transform stigma 
(Marvasti 2005; Mir 2011; Umbreit, Lewis, and Burns 2003). Through this 
research, scholars have identified a range of strategies that provide self-
protective benefits to Muslim individuals and that illustrate Muslims’ con-
siderable resilience in the face of negative stereotyping and discriminatory 
treatment (Küçükcan 2004; O’Brien 2011; Ryan 2011; Valenta 2009). In 
addition, scholars have recently pushed for examinations of power that will 
highlight the broader structural forces and historical events that help explain 
how stigma works: where it emerges, how people manage it, and what its 
consequences are (Barreto and Ellemers 2010; Link and Phelan 2001).
In this analysis, we build on scholarship documenting how people collec-
tively experience and resist stigma while also taking seriously the challenge 
of interrogating power dynamics in stigmatization processes. Using a col-
laborative ethnographic approach and a critical theoretical lens, we examine 
how local Turkish Community Center (TCC) participants attempt to manage 
stigmatized identities and dispel Islamophobic stereotypes. We explore how 
they recognize their stigmatized status and seek to reinvent the Muslim iden-
tity in the minds of non-Muslim Americans by complicating what being 
Muslim means. Our findings illustrate how Turks at the TCC employ the 
practice of “dialogue” to emphasize nationality over religion in their cultural 
education efforts, to normalize the Muslim self, and to embody Islamic ideals 
through gendered presentations of Turkishness. These practices allow them 
to effectively manage stigma, but have broader consequences for racial, eth-
nic, cultural, and gender inequality in the United States.
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Islamophobia and Negative Muslim Stereotypes 
Post-9/11
“I have not been able to discover any period in European or American history 
since the Middle Ages in which Islam was generally discussed or thought about 
outside a framework created by passion, prejudice, and political interests.”
–Edward W. Said (1980, p. 488)
Negative views of Middle Eastern people and of Islam have long been 
embedded in Western popular belief systems and scholarship (Allison 2013; 
el-Aswad 2013; Said 1979). Indeed, Westerners have traditionally viewed 
Muslim people(s) through an Orientalist lens that portrays them as an object 
of fear, hostility, and/or exoticization. However, 9/11 galvanized a shift in the 
intensity and character of Westerners’ perceptions of the Islamic “other” 
(Alam 2006; Tuastad 2003). Islamophobia, or the “unfounded hostility 
towards Islam, and therefore fear or dislike of all or most Muslims” 
(Runneymede Trust 1997), has become so pervasive in the United States that 
in 2006 American Muslims elicited more negative views than any other reli-
gious minority group in the United States (Kalkan, Layman, and Uslaner 
2009). In 2009, a Gallup poll revealed that Americans are twice as likely to 
maintain negative feelings toward Muslims as they are toward individuals of 
any other major religion (Gallup, Inc. 2009). Anti-Muslim sentiment, cata-
lyzed by the events of 9/11, may also be exacerbated by Islam’s position as 
the fastest growing religion in the United States today (Ayers 2007). Scholars 
have documented how many non-Muslim Americans are not only threatened 
by the negative images presented to them in the media (Ali et al. 2011), espe-
cially post-9/11, but also by the increasing prevalence of a formerly unfamil-
iar religion (Ayoub 2011).
Under these conditions, an unparalleled number of anti-Muslim hate 
crimes and targeted acts of violence cropped up in communities throughout 
the United States after 9/11 (Ayers 2007). In fact, the number of anti-Muslim 
hate crimes reported the year following 9/11 exceeded those reported by 
black, Jewish, and gay individuals; while the reports leveled off in 2002, 
Muslims continue to claim remarkably high levels of hate crime victimiza-
tion (Rubenstein 2004). According to Ayers’s (2007) estimates, 57 percent of 
American Muslims reported personally experiencing bias or discrimination 
themselves and 87 percent reported knowing a fellow Muslim who had expe-
rienced verbal abuse, discrimination in the workplace, and/or religious profil-
ing. Perhaps even more telling about the post-9/11 Muslim experience in the 
United States is the fact that 40 percent of American Muslims believe that 
“the U.S. is fighting a war against Islam” (Ayers 2007). Illustrative of this 
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figurative war, researchers have demonstrated how the personal experiences 
of individuals who look Middle Eastern reveal how Americans are effectively 
pitted against them irrespective of their actual faith (Brennan 2011). In addi-
tion to coping with violence and strained social interactions, Muslim immi-
grants/individuals exhibiting a Middle Eastern appearance have also been 
subject to increasingly restrictive legal regulations (Klandermans, van der 
Toorn, and van Stekelenburg 2008; Patel 2012), especially pertaining to state, 
national, and international securitization measures taken by the United States 
government (Bleich 2009).
Stigma and Stigmatization Processes
Social scientists have most frequently used the concept of stigma to situate 
the experiences of individuals, like Muslims, who are identified by nega-
tively connoted statuses such as race (Howarth 2006; Storrs 1999), religion 
(Ryan 2011), sexuality (Herek 1998; Herek, Saha, and Burack 2013), and 
health (Fink and Tasman 1992; Parker and Aggleton 2003; Scambler 2009). 
A large body of research demonstrates that a stigmatized status “contami-
nates” people’s identities and has implications for the stigmatized individu-
al’s life chances, particularly in relation to suffering, social isolation, health, 
and wellness (Carr and Friedman 2005). This is especially true for those 
whose stigmatized status is highly visible, such as those whose bodies carry 
markers of stigmatized racial (Fernández 2007; Lenhardt 2004) or health 
(Kleck 1968; Puhl and Brownell 2006) status or those who wear highly rec-
ognizable and easily identifiable religious clothing (Endelstein and Ryan 
2013; Ghumman and Jackson 2010).
Though scholars often approach stigma development and its consequences 
in relation to individual social status positions such as race, class, gender, 
able-bodiedness, and religion, stigmatization is a socially embedded process 
(Collins 2004; Corrigan and Watson 2002). As such, a growing body of 
research addresses how stigmatized group members experience, resist, and 
challenge stigma. For example, microlevel factors such as the “specific 
norms and expectations” that structure intergroup relationships and govern 
cross-group contact affect how, when, and where members of stigmatized 
groups experience discrimination (Barreto and Ellemers 2010, p. 435). 
Similarly, the presence of community and religious organizations influences 
how stigmatized group members can positively cope with unfair treatment 
(Abdullah 2009; Göle 2003). Access to groups that reject negative stereo-
types, resist stigmatization, and provide social support also provides impor-
tant self-protective benefits to individuals managing stigma (Küçükcan 2004; 
O’Brien 2011; Ryan 2011; Valenta 2009).
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Scholars have identified a host of collective and individual responses to 
post-9/11 anti-Muslim sentiment that illustrate group resilience. For exam-
ple, studies recognize the benefits of seeking the help of others or adopting 
positive religious strategies when confronted with anti-Muslim behavior or 
media portrayals (Abu-Raiya, Pargament, and Mahoney 2011; Barkdull et al. 
2011; Bonet 2011; Umbreit, Lewis, and Burns 2003). Some Muslims have 
embraced a self-preservation approach, attempting to distance themselves 
from the negative and violent images associated with Islam and identify, 
instead, with the Muslim rhetoric of peace and tolerance, despite the intensi-
fied anti-Muslim sentiment directed toward them (Ayoub 2011; el-Aswad 
2013; I. Kaya 2004). Indeed, many Muslim groups have expressed the sor-
row and compassion they feel toward the victims and the victim’s families of 
terrorist attacks related to Islamic fundamentalism and have internalized a 
sense of shame and embarrassment to be associated with individuals who 
would cause such devastation (Johns, Schmader, and Lickel 2005; Khalid 
2007).
Additionally, some Muslims engage in group-based activities that aid in 
the management of anti-Muslim stereotypes (I. Kaya 2004; Umbreit, Lewis, 
and Burns 2003). Embarking upon educational campaigns (O’Brien 2011), 
partnering with non-Muslim religious organizations, and intentionally spark-
ing interfaith dialogue are among the range of resilient group responses that 
act to buffer Muslims against the negative impacts of stigmatization (Barkdull 
et al. 2011; Khalid 2007). Some Muslims, for example, have reached out to 
hate crime victims and offenders in the hopes of finding or encouraging emo-
tional support and healing and promoting cultural education aimed at reduc-
ing hate crime recidivism (Abu-Raiya, Pargament, and Mahoney 2011; 
Barkdull et al. 2011; Umbreit, Lewis, and Burns 2003). Others, however, 
prefer to seek respite through intragroup relations. Although it may cause 
additional hardships for Muslims, because their assumed failure to assimilate 
to western non-Muslim culture may be interpreted as lack of loyalty to their 
host country, many turn toward a stronger identification with their Muslim 
culture as a shield against anti-Muslim sentiment (Barkdull et al. 2011; 
Klandermans, van der Toorn, and van Stekelenburg 2008).
Stigma and Social Structure
Studies like these, which examine stigmatization and stigma management 
as socially embedded processes, involve identifying immediate contextual 
factors—such as the availability of resources to launch a campaign or the 
presence of a local Muslim community to work alongside—that fuel 
specific stigma management techniques. They also look at the social 
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structural factors—like hegemonic values, prevailing social norms, and 
broader patterns of inequality—that influence stigma development and 
management (Goffman 1963). Scholars have recently offered a more tightly 
sculpted and reinvented definition of stigma that emphasizes looking more 
closely at social structure and relations of power (Link and Phelan 2001). 
Here, “stigma exists when the elements of labeling, stereotyping, separat-
ing, status loss and discrimination co-occur in a power situation that allows 
these processes to unfold” (Link and Phelan 2001, p. 382). Studies that 
examine these “power situations” reveal how macrolevel structural factors 
such as economic trends and societal change influence discrimination 
against stigmatized groups (Barreto and Ellemers 2010; Collins 2004; 
Corrigan and Watson 2002; Scambler 2009).
Critical race theory, with a long tradition of interrogating power, fits well 
with this approach. Building on classic works that examine how macrolevel 
racial inequalities manifest at the micro level (Du Bois 1903; Fanon 1967), 
critical race theorists regularly explore the impact social structure has on the 
daily experiences of racialized others. Many of these analyses explore how 
inequality is embedded in and perpetuated by seemingly neutral language, 
practices, and institutions (Crenshaw 1991; Duster 2003; Feagin 2013). 
Recent works, especially, have analyzed how language that seems to stress 
equality, tolerance, or celebration of diversity nonetheless contributes to the 
reproduction of racism and inequality (Bonilla-Silva 2010; Crenshaw 2011; 
Hage 1998). For example, Hage (1998) illustrates how white multicultural-
ism “works to mystify, and to keep out of the public discourse, other multi-
cultural realities” (p. 19). Though multiculturalist rhetoric emphasizes 
tolerance and celebration of diversity, white people largely retain power to 
produce images of themselves and ethnic/racial “others” that frame some 
people as safe and others as potentially dangerous outsiders.
Crenshaw (2011) documents a similar trend in President Obama’s “racial 
maneuvering” on the campaign trail. She argues that him referring to Jeremiah 
Wright’s anger over racial inequality as “powerful” and “misunderstood” 
frames Wright/his followers and their white critics as equal, “warring fac-
tions whose pain was both legitimate and misunderstood by the other” 
(Crenshaw 2011, p. 1322). By acknowledging the legacy of race in America, 
but framing it as something we all must move past, Obama’s “dissociative 
gesture” appeases potential voters while leaving intact “the racial barriers 
that continue to shape the life chances of many people of color” (Crenshaw 
2011, p. 1333). Other critical race feminist scholars illustrate how transna-
tional feminist activists risk participating in the same dynamic. Adopting a 
“paternalistic” approach to Arab women that frames them as in need of res-
cue from oppressive Arab men/regimes, views them through a “lens of 
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inferiority,” or imposes Western value systems on them and perpetuates ste-
reotypes of Arab women as powerless and passive (Saloom 2005, p. 73–74).
As these studies suggest, critical race theorists document how seemingly 
progressive moves like multiculturalism, frank discussion of racism, or 
transnational feminist activism, because they take place amidst unbalanced 
power relations, tend to reproduce rather than challenge inequality. In this 
context, racialized/ethnic others who occupy a position of limited power to 
challenge dominant discourse are left to navigate negative and/or “white-
centered” images of themselves in day-to-day interaction (Chou and Feagin 
2008; Hage 1998). The strategies they use to undertake this navigation both 
stem from and independently challenge or reinforce preexisting patterns of 
structural inequality.
For Muslims in the United States, longstanding patterns of negative ste-
reotyping by Westerners are one factor that illustrates how imbalanced social-
structural power dynamics influence stigmatization processes. Muslim 
people, customs, practices, and traditions have historically been “othered” in 
orientalist discourse (Said 1979; Saito 2001). After 9/11, the trend intensified 
as people reimagined Islam as a clear and ever-present threat, putting 
“immense pressure on [Muslim] communities to negotiate the sustained 
moral and social stigmatization in narrating Islam” (Ibrahim 2007, p. 47). 
Muslims became “intolerable subjects” who face pressure to display loyalty, 
adopt Western values, and “prove the legitimacy of their belonging” (Lentin 
and Titley 2012, p. 123). This, together with general cultural insecurities 
associated with the shift to a neoliberal state (Garland 2001; Wacquant 2010) 
and the widespread belief that we live in a postracial society (Bonilla-Silva 
2010; Crenshaw 2011) make it likely that Muslim Americans’ stigma man-
agement techniques—like those of most marginalized groups embedded in 
social structures with unequal power dynamics—will emphasize integration 
and therefore contribute to the reproduction of inequality (Lentin and Titley 
2012).
In this paper, we use collaborative ethnographic methods to address that 
question. We examine how members of a local Turkish community center 
manage and challenge stigma in an institutional context that encourages 
intra- (i.e. Turkish Muslim) and intergroup (i.e. non-Muslim American) inter-
actions. Drawing on critical race theory (Crenshaw 2011; Lentin and Titley 
2011; Saloom 2005), we contribute to stigma scholarship by examining the 
socially embedded nature of stigmatization processes and the “power situa-
tions” in which they unfold (Link and Phelan 2001). Our findings reveal that 
Turkish participants manage stigma through three discursive and embodied 
“dialogue” strategies: emphasizing secular identity/ies by focusing on cul-
tural education, normalizing the Muslim self in conversation about religion, 
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and presenting their ideals through the gendered self. These strategies stem 
from and have consequences for structural inequality in the United States.
The Turkish Community Center (TCC)
The Turkish Community Center (TCC)1 is a cultural organization in a mid-
sized southern city that attempts to encourage and facilitate intercultural/
interfaith dialogue. It is a branch of a larger regional organization founded by 
Turkish volunteers for the now international Hizmet (service) or Gülen 
Movement. These Turks follow the teachings of Fethullah Gülen,2 a Muslim 
Turk currently residing in the United States who promotes Islam as a peaceful 
and tolerant religion and preaches that education and altruism should be para-
mount among its followers (Ebaugh 2010; Gülen 2004). Funded by an esti-
mated 20 million supporters worldwide, who are reported to donate between 
5 to 20 percent of their yearly income to the cause, the Gülen movement is 
responsible for establishing Islam-driven schools, media outlets, and cultural 
centers, like the TCC, across the globe (BBC World News 2013; Ebaugh 
2010). The Gülen movement does not have any official membership but is 
instead comprised of an informal, invisible network of advocates located 
around the world (BBC World News 2013). The majority of members, how-
ever, continue to reside in Turkey, and it is speculated that many Gülen fol-
lowers hold influential positions at all levels of the Turkish government; 
opponents of Gülen believe that he is encouraging his Turkish followers to 
infiltrate the Turkish government in order to one day dismantle the Turkish 
secular state (Arango 2013; BBC World News 2013). Despite these accusa-
tions, members of the Gülen movement, including those at the TCC, continue 
to focus their efforts on intercultural/interfaith dialogue at a local level hop-
ing to contribute to the larger, international Hizmet movement.
According to their informational literature, the stated purpose of the TCC’s 
many organized activities such as luncheons, dinners, and spiritual meetings 
is to foster communication between individuals of diverse backgrounds, aid 
in relationship building, and promote cross-cultural education. These cultural 
education efforts are uniformly practiced by groups who support Gülen, not 
with the intention of recruiting individuals into the movement but to encour-
age intercultural/interfaith dialogue (Ebaugh 2010). Like other groups affili-
ated with the Gülen movement, the TCC has three main types of events: (1) 
annual/semiannual large-scale events that formally highlight the center and 
its mission to the public, the media, and/or local spiritual leaders; (2) Smaller-
scale weekly, monthly, or quarterly informal events designed to highlight 
Turkish culture, but also to occasionally discuss American culture or history; 
(3) Turk-only events. The majority of these activities—book club meetings, 
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cooking classes, luncheons, children’s activities, and cultural gatherings, for 
example—are held at its headquarters located on a main road at the edge of a 
residential neighborhood. Large events such as cultural festivals, diversity 
conferences, or the Annual Dialogue Dinner are held elsewhere. The TCC 
building has a children’s playroom, reading room, prayer room, large kitchen 
(necessary for the preparation of food, which is home-cooked for nearly all 
TCC events), and a spacious living/dining space.
The TCC’s annual large-scale events and regular, smaller-scale classes, 
gatherings, and activities are indicative of their mission to educate Americans 
about both Muslim and Turkish culture and to stimulate dialogue. Events 
reserved for Turks only suggest that Turkish TCC participants are not inter-
ested in complete acculturation. Instead, they focus on successful integration 
while remaining committed to their own cultural values. Therefore, they hold 
religious celebrations, Turkish language classes for children, and even social 
activities for Turks at the TCC building. Turk-only events are not prohibitive, 
however. If an American wants to attend, they can (and some, like Crystal, 
did) but the program is presented in Turkish and the events are not advertised 
for outside of the TCC Turkish community. Public events, on the other hand, 
are advertised on the TCC website, via email, or on flyers distributed in the 
local community. Nonetheless, these events usually draw participants who 
have a personal tie with a TCC member.
The TCC is located in an economically thriving midsized southern city. 
Due in part to the presence of several universities and colleges, the city main-
tains a Democratic majority and has a relatively high number of foreign-born 
residents compared with the surrounding area. Only 1 percent of the city’s 
recorded religious practitioners are Muslim (Pew Research Center 2014). 
The majority of people are either evangelical Protestants or Catholic (Pew 
Research Center 2014). Most of the city’s residents are white (40 percent) or 
black (55 percent) (United States Census 2010). People of other racial/ethnic 
backgrounds make up only a small fraction of the population. As is the trend 
with groups associated with Gülen, the TCC has no official procedure for city 
residents to become members. Instead, informal membership of frequent 
event attendees and volunteers is implied. In our time in the field, we met a 
small group of (implied) members: approximately 22 core volunteers who 
ran and staffed nearly every event and 47 semiactive or very active partici-
pants who attended/volunteered at events more frequently than others.
When compared with the city’s population, TCC members are dispropor-
tionately Turkish Muslims. Almost two-thirds (64 percent) of core volunteers 
and half of active participants are Turkish Muslims. Turkish/Muslim women 
are the majority of core volunteers (41 percent3) and 23 percent of active par-
ticipants. Non-Muslim American women account for 23 percent of core 
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volunteers and the majority (43 percent) of active participants. Turkish/
Muslim men are about a quarter of core volunteers and active participants (23 
percent).4 Non-Muslim American men are 14 percent of core volunteers and 
11 percent of active participants. The overwhelming majority of non-Muslim 
American members are white, middle/upper-middle class retired professionals 
or students. Though there is a bit more variance among Turkish Muslims (e.g., 
more families, working professionals, and/or women with limited English 
skills and less educational achievement), most of them are also middle/upper-
middle class. People who are not members, but who attend TCC events spo-
radically, are also mostly white American or Turkish5 middle/upper-middle 
class women. Black city residents rarely attend TCC gatherings, but those who 
do also come from middle/upper-middle class social class backgrounds.
A Board of Directors (BOD) and Executive Administrator oversee the 
TCC and are responsible for its decision making, finances, and large-scale 
annual events such as the Annual Dialogue dinner and TCC-sponsored trips 
to Turkey. Although the individuals on the BOD changed during our data col-
lection period, its demographic characteristics remained unaltered. It consists 
of two Turkish men (one serving as president), two white American men, and 
one white American woman. All five are working or retired professionals and 
considerable financial contributors to the TCC. The Executive Administrator 
(the only paid position in the organization) is a Turkish Muslim man. The 
gender and ethnic composition of the TCC’s administration reflects broader 
patterns in inequality, but is also indicative of the organization’s goals. For 
example, putting Americans on the BOD helps Turks accumulate the social 
and cultural capital required to navigate American culture (Nee and Sanders 
2001) and is tied to upper class white American Southerners’ tradition of 
social philanthropy (Kendall 2002). It also reflects the organization’s goal of 
encouraging intercultural dialogue. The TCC administrations’ gender compo-
sition is related to the fact that most participants adhere to traditional Muslim 
gender roles that relegate women and men to the private and public spheres, 
respectively (Güler 2006). An exception is made for Alice, the white American 
woman on the board of directors who, like many American women at TCC, 
is not held to the same gender norms that Turkish Muslim women are.
The TCC is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization. While fees for various 
events are suggested, they are rarely solicited. In line with other groups associ-
ated with the Gülen movement, the majority of funding for TCC events, the 
Executive Administrator’s stipend, and building costs are donated by Turkish 
community members. Some of the major donors sit on the BOD, but most of 
the Turks who sustain the TCC financially are working to support their fami-
lies (often on one income) or are single students at local universities. In addi-
tion to direct fiscal donations provided by Turks, Turkish women regularly 
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provide incidentals such as food (essential to every TCC event, no matter how 
small in size), silverware, or themed decorations. Contributions from Turkish 
members are only occasionally supplemented by donations from Americans 
who attend events.
Methodology
Data for this analysis come from a two-year collaborative ethnography at 
TCC. Crystal, an American woman, collaborated with Eyup, a Turkish male 
graduate research assistant, to collect data for this study. Crystal gained 
access to TCC through Yilmaz, a Turkish acquaintance of Eyup’s who was 
the Executive Administrator of TCC at the time. Yilmaz invited both research-
ers to various engagements at the TCC. Once established as participants, we 
solicited TCC event attendees for interviews. While collaborative ethnogra-
phies in the anthropological tradition involve researchers and participants 
working together at all stages in the research process (Lassiter 2005; 
Rappaport 2008), we employed a sociological collaborative ethnographic 
approach. Here, the researchers, not researchers and participants, work col-
laboratively throughout the process (May and Patillo-McCoy 2000). This 
collaborative approach was advantageous in that throughout all phases of our 
research, we were able to explore multiple interpretations of the data and 
utilize the divergence of our individual attributes (gender, ethnicity, language 
skills, theoretical orientation/methodological strengths) to gain insight that 
would otherwise not have been apparent or available.
We coordinated our fieldwork efforts by simultaneously collecting data 
from a single setting as often as possible (May and Patillo-McCoy 2000). To 
ensure an ample amount of data collection, both researchers attended a vari-
ety of TCC gatherings including cultural events such as cooking classes and 
coffee nights, informational luncheons featuring speakers from the commu-
nity, book club meetings, religious celebrations, the Annual Dialogue 
Dinner, a community fundraiser and a large cultural festival. On occasion, 
restrictions such as the gender composition of event participants (e.g. wom-
en’s cooking classes) or language barriers (e.g. interviewees who did not 
speak English) prohibited both researchers from attending particular events. 
Therefore, the eligible researcher (e.g. Crystal for the women’s cooking 
classes) attended and collected data. When these restraints arose, the person 
who attended the event would immediately share field notes, recorded con-
versations and other data for coding and analysis. Some TCC events—like 
family picnic days or Turkish language/cultural classes for children—were 
for Turkish participants only. Our analysis is limited to events where the 
general public was openly invited.
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We spent a combined total of approximately 100 hours in the field. 
Identifying ourselves as researchers allowed us to take notes in the field (on 
a small notepad during the event) with little disruption—notes we subse-
quently used to compose a complete account of the event for coding and 
analysis. Whether we took in-field notations (and how detailed/lengthy they 
were) depended upon the event attended. For example, during luncheons and 
cooking classes, note taking was common. Many participants wrote down 
questions to ask the speaker or made notations about recipe ingredients. We 
were therefore able to take notes openly and with little restriction. However, 
during coffee night or at religious celebrations, open and lengthy note taking 
was difficult and occasionally off-putting for participants, so we refrained 
from taking in-field notes.
In addition to fieldwork, we conducted a total of seventeen 60–90 minute 
formally structured interviews with a variety of TCC participants: six 
American women, one Canadian woman, four Turkish women, two American 
men, and four Turkish men. We digitally recorded interviews, transcribed 
them verbatim, and translated from Turkish to English when necessary. 
Interviews focused on participants’ roles in and relationships with the TCC 
and other TCC participants, their understanding of TCC’s mission, and views 
of its success at mission implementation. Our limited number of interviews is 
the result of data saturation (observational and interviewee response repeti-
tion) and key participants signaling decreased willingness to be interviewed 
by us. After noticing reduced correspondence, invitations to events, and fre-
quent rescheduling of pending interviews by key informants, Eyup received 
a phone call from a male Turkish leader at TCC asking why we were ques-
tioning participants about gender segregation at events and the gendered divi-
sion of labor. Noting their discomfort and in order to preserve relationships 
with respondents and prevent harm in the field (Esterberg 2002), we chose to 
stop interviewing, but remained in the field as participant-observers. We sup-
plemented formal interviews and observational data with several semistruc-
tured informal, often spontaneous, interviews conducted in the field and with 
textual data and content analysis from the TCC website, brochures, informa-
tional literature, PowerPoint presentations, news articles, press releases, and 
mass e-mails (Esterberg 2002).
Data analysis for the project took place in four stages. First, we compiled 
interview transcriptions, field notes, and textual data into one dataset. In the 
second stage, we used an open coding strategy to independently code data 
line by line (Charmaz 2006; Esterberg 2002). During the open coding pro-
cess, we also utilized in vivo coding, taking terms directly from participants’ 
commentary to describe particular phenomenon occurring in the field 
(Charmaz 2006). After we had read and coded each item, we moved into the 
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third stage of analysis, which involved auditing codes, determining main 
themes, and developing our analysis based upon their interconnectedness. 
Both researchers also composed situational maps, social world maps, and 
theoretical free writes and memos to aid analysis and enhance thematic com-
position (Clarke 2005). In the final stage, we gleaned the data and did another 
round of more focused coding. We identified usable examples of each of our 
themes to include in this analysis.
Data analysis was enriched by our collaborative ethnographic method-
ological approach. Field observations and data interpretation reflected our 
varying structural positions and perspectives while also allowing for a more 
judicious and well-rounded examination of the data (Belgrave and Smith 
1995). When occasional analytical disagreements arose, they were usually 
due to gaps in the Crystal’s knowledge about Turkish culture. For example, 
there were times when she would observe something unfamiliar during a 
ladies-only event or question gender segregation at TCC events—which 
Eyup could explain based on his intimate knowledge of Turkish culture. The 
opposite also occurred. Eyup, for example, would dismiss the significance of 
a particular observation or interview response that Crystal found compelling. 
Most often these discrepancies facilitated dialogue between researchers and 
enabled a deeper understanding of field observations or caused a productive 
dispute, forcing further consideration of the matter. Generally when a conflict 
of interpretation arose, it signified a deeper meaning to be considered in the 
data than either researcher had originally understood. In sum, both research-
ers were in general agreement about coding schema and application. The 
handful of coding discrepancies that occurred were either due to simple error 
or resolved through discussion.
Occupying different status positions in the field meant reflexivity was cru-
cial throughout the research process. We utilized methodological and analyti-
cal tactics for reflexivity to track our varying positional ties in the field. 
Gender, language, national origin, age, marital status, and connections with 
the community influenced when/where we were alternatively seen/treated as 
insider(s) or outsider(s). For example, as an American female, Crystal could 
attend the ladies cooking class whereas Eyup, a Turkish male, was quickly 
approached (at the door) and told the event was “ladies only.” On other occa-
sions, such as a religious celebration conducted in Turkish, Eyup could 
understand the ceremony and, as a man, was offered a seat in the front of the 
room where he could better see the presentation. Crystal did not speak Turkish 
and, as a woman, was not granted that level of access. In addition, as an 
American woman and a Turkish man conducting research together in an insti-
tutional space governed (at least partially) by Turkish cultural norms, we 
were cognizant of what our status as a mixed-gender research team meant to 
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participants. We carefully managed gender boundaries at TCC by generally 
avoiding initiation of cross-gender social contact in order to uphold Muslim 
custom and protect the comfort of our subjects. However, Crystal was occa-
sionally able to violate gender-segregation norms in ways that Eyup could 
not because of Turkish participants’ assumptions that, as an American, she 
was naïve to such interactional customs (Hewitt and Alqahtani 2003). 
Gathering multiple forms of data—ethnographic, interview, textual, and 
reflexive—from our dual positions enabled the analysis of stigma/stereotype 
management strategies that follows.
Challenging Muslim Stigmatization at the TCC
Anti-Muslim stigma is a very real component of Muslim Americans’ lives 
(Cainkar 2009; Panagopoulos 2006; Rippy and Newman 2006), including the 
participants at TCC. The TCC’s affiliation with the Gülen movement leads its 
efforts to focus largely on intercultural/interfaith exchanges as a remedy for 
anti-Muslim sentiment in the United States. Conversation about explicit neg-
ative Muslim stereotypes arose only infrequently at formally organized TCC 
events. Instead, there was a tacit understanding between Americans and 
Turks that Muslims in the West are stigmatized. One of the TCC’s main 
objectives was to have participants confront negative stereotypes assigned to 
Muslims and subject them to critical analysis. This was accomplished using 
a practice Turks at the TCC call “dialogue.” A feature in all three Abrahamic 
religions, dialogue is particularly common among followers of Islam; proph-
ets of the Qur’an are cited as the ecumenical origin of dialogue (Kurucan and 
Erol 2012). Muslims who are members of the Gülen movement, like those at 
the TCC, stress the importance of intercultural/interfaith dialogue and are 
therefore especially likely to utilize this practice (Ebaugh 2010; Gülen 2004).
Dialogue, however, is not unique to Abrahamic religions nor is it unique to 
the Gülen movement itself. Scholars have analyzed its role in the resolution of 
community conflicts (Lohmann and Van Til 2011; Saunders and Parker 2011); 
citizen engagement, politics, and social work (Van Til 2011); and team-based 
and/or organizational learning (Dixon 1996; Senge 1999). Across these con-
texts, dialogue plays an important role in producing collective change via 
meaning-making among individuals and groups (Bohm 2004; Dixon 1996). 
Unlike debate or discussion, where participants intend to justify an assertion 
or convince others of the validity of his/her claim, dialogue is a process of 
constructive listening wherein communicators suspend preconceived assump-
tions and are open to alternative perspectives (Bohm 2004; Dixon 1996; 
Lohmann and Van Til 2011; Senge 1999). It is intended to “move us out of our 
isolated existence and beyond our restricted views” via a structured and 
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sustained process wherein boundaries can dissolve and healing relationships 
or friendships can be forged (Lohmann and Van Til 2011, p. 19).
For Turkish participants at TCC, dialogue is understood in these terms. It 
is meant to inculcate knowledge and understanding through meaningful 
interpersonal interaction (Gülen 2004; Kurucan and Erol 2012). As, Bekir, a 
male Turkish TCC participant, put it, dialogue “means meeting people like 
you [gestures to Crystal]” and “thinking about something different in cul-
ture.” When asked to elaborate, he stated that when he was new to the United 
States, people asked him questions about Turkey that he had never heard 
before—questions that revealed their misconceptions. “Because they don’t 
know our culture,” he said, “they think that we are [ruthless] with people, we 
are cutting their arms if they steal something. Like that, you know?” He 
located these misunderstandings in lack of interpersonal interaction and 
framed dialogue as a solution. “Because we do not have any conversation 
with them, they don’t know us, we don’t know them, but that’s why we have 
to tell them,” he asserted.
Unlike traditional applications of the practice, where all parties recognize 
that they are engaging in dialogue and understand what it means to do so (Bohm 
2004; Senge 1999), at the TCC, Turks understand the organization’s goal of 
using dialogue to dispel stigma, but Americans are either unaware of the term 
or do not fully understand its meaning. Instead, Turks regularly prompt 
American participants to suspend their assumptions about Muslims and to 
accept an alternative worldview where Muslims are not all violent. Turks 
believe that dialogue, as embedded in face-to-face interaction, will increase 
familiarity and encourage understanding, acceptance, and stigma transforma-
tion. As Yilmaz put it: “People are enemies to what they don’t know.” Dialogue 
is a means for TCC members to turn would-be “enemies” (i.e. “normals” or 
nonstigmatized persons) into the “wise”—people who become “intimately 
privy” to the lives of a stigmatized group and therefore sympathetic with them 
(Goffman 1963, p. 28). They accomplish this by prioritizing secular selves via 
cultural education, normalizing the Muslim self in conversation about religion, 
and presenting gendered versions of Turkish identity.
Prioritizing the Secular Self: Dialogue via Cultural Education
The presence of many headscarf-adorned women and frequent discourse lik-
ening Islam to Christianity might lead the casual American onlooker to assume 
that the TCC is a religious organization. However, attending TCC events 
quickly reveals that the organization places significantly more emphasis on 
nationality and secular Turkish culture than religion.6 Two factors help explain 
why participants frame the TCC as a cultural rather than a religious space. 
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First, highlighting secular Turkish culture and deemphasizing Islam allows 
Turks to resist negative Muslim stereotypes. Second, in contrast to many 
Muslim groups around the world, though more than 99.8 percent of Turks 
associate with the Islamic faith (Central Intelligence Agency 2014), they iden-
tify as a secular people (A. Kaya 2010). Accordingly, Selim, a Turkish man, 
told us that while often “culture and faith are hard to distinguish,” the TCC 
does not represent the “religious side.” As an American woman put it, the 
cultural center is, “not an Islamic sect … but a Turkish sect.”
Making the TCC a primarily cultural rather than religious space means 
Turkish participants walk a symbolic tightrope separating nationality from 
religion. Many of them, similar to other followers of Gülen, are in the United 
States seeking the freedom of religious expression they were not provided in 
Turkey. In addition, spirituality is embedded in the institutional mission of 
the TCC, which defines the cultural center as a “multicultural, faith-based 
organization, operating for spiritual and educational purposes” and religion is 
a forefront concern for many Turkish TCC participants. Still, they regularly 
emphasize (in word and in practice) how nonreligious the organization’s 
focus is. They do this using the primary form of dialogue at TCC: cultural 
education.
Rather than being an explicitly stated goal or task, dialogue is embedded 
in formal public events at the center as well as abroad—events that focus on 
culture rather than religion. At language classes, cooking classes, Ladies’ 
Coffee Night, book club, spiritual dialogue meetings, the TCC Annual 
Dinner, and the Dialogue Trips to Turkey, Turkish participants present some-
thing unique about their culture, provide direct opportunities for Americans 
and Turks to participate in and experience it, and accept praise and accolades 
from attendees. For example, TCC-sponsored Dialogue Trips to Turkey, a 
feature of many Gülen-affiliated cultural groups (Ebaugh 2010), offer 
Americans an opportunity to not only visit Turkey, but stay in the homes of 
local Turks and visit mosques, government buildings, nonprofit organiza-
tions, and corporate-run facilities that they would not otherwise have access 
to as a tourist. Frank, an American TCC participant, described his excursion 
as, “a wonderful experience,” explaining that a male Turkish TCC leader had 
arranged for the American travelers to tour a Turkish school:
After dinner that night at the school, we all split up, and went home with a 
Turkish family and spent the night in their home…it was just an incredible 
experience, to be able to do something like this, I mean, you could spend a lot 
of money for a tour and never get that kind of experience where you are actually 
spending time in Turkish people’s homes and getting to know them on a real 
level.
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Moreover, recruitment presentations for these trips provide fodder for local-
ized cultural education at the TCC itself. The presentations feature Turkish 
organizers as well as former American travelers who present pictures and tell 
stories from their trips encouraging interested Americans to join the next 
Dialogue Trip to Turkey. Both the trips and the recruitment presentations 
highlight unique aspects of Turkish culture and provide Americans access to 
Turks on a “real level” where one can engage in conversations and share 
experiences that, as Frank identifies, a tourist would not otherwise have.
Similar processes take place in classes and other gatherings at the center. 
The women’s cooking class involves Turkish women presenting a cooking 
demonstration for an audience of mostly American TCC participants. They 
feature dishes from all over Turkey, often differing by region in preparation 
techniques. A typical menu might include bulgurlu mercimek salatasi 
(cracked wheat and lentil salad), kashk-e badejmjan (eggplant spread), talas 
boregi (talash lamb pastry) and kalburabasti (walnut cookies in syrup). To 
encourage participation and familiarity with the food, Turkish women often 
ask Americans to help complete the meal and offer hand embroidered heads-
carves as prizes to those who try the recipe at home and report their experi-
ence. Reflecting on her experience in these classes, Patricia, an American 
participant, told Crystal in the presence and to the delight of the Turkish 
cooking demonstrators, “I like Turkish food very much. … [The cooking 
class is] a lot of fun and very interesting. It’s informal and pleasant and of 
course the women are so friendly—it’s a nice experience.”
Emma, an American female participant, reacted to a “Henna Night” (a 
special ladies-only event) presentation, which was comparable in format to 
the cooking class, with a similar sentiment:
It’s been this warming influence of being able to see the cultural similarities 
and how people—how Turkish people and local people do things similarly. The 
orientation towards family and the pride in their cooking [and culture]. So 
that’s just a nice feeling.
While the concept of dialogue is not formally introduced to Americans at 
these events, it guides the actions of Turkish participants, who are focused on 
reshaping the ways Americans think about Turkish culture/people by making 
them more familiar with it/them (Bohm 2004; Dixon 1996; Senge 1999). 
Meaningful interpersonal interactions at these events help dissolve boundar-
ies and create a space for Americans to become, as Turks often put it, their 
“friends” (Gülen 2004; Lohmann and Van Til 2011). As Emma’s comments 
suggest, one way Turkish members accomplish this is by normalizing Turkish 
culture/people for Americans. When they offer headscarves as prizes at 
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cooking class or offer hands-on experience with food, art, and language, 
Turkish practices become “similar” to what “local people” do, producing 
“nice feeling[s]” and experiences for American participants.
This approach is common for Turkish people, even in other contexts. 
Turks often emphasize the complexity of their identities by focusing on simi-
larities with European culture and disassociating with negatively stigmatized 
groups like Arabs (A. Kaya 2010). At TCC, as in countries where Turks have 
well-established historic migration patterns, prioritizing and emphasizing 
national identity/culture facilitates stigma management (Abadan-Unat 1995).
Providing Americans with experiences that normalize artifacts of Turkish 
culture and stress the similarity of Turkish and American practices challenges 
negative stereotypes about Turks/Muslims via contiguity claims. Contiguity 
claims are arguments meant to reinforce the message that a group has been 
inappropriately stigmatized by pointing out its similarity to a nondeviant 
group (Berbrier 2002, p. 560). At TCC, Turks use practices that instill famil-
iarity through interpersonal interaction. This leads Americans to make conti-
guity claims about Turks’ similarity to “local people” without Turkish 
participants directly making assertions themselves.
However, Americans who participate in hands-on experiences like travel-
ing to Turkey and participating in cooking classes also occasionally frame 
Turkish culture as magical, distant, or unfamiliar. For example, many 
Americans who traveled to Turkey as part of a Dialogue Trip described their 
experiences as almost surreal. Helen, a female American TCC participant, 
said that Turkey, “captivated [her] imagination,” evoking a mystical sort of 
imagery as she described her travels through the Turkish countryside. 
Framing Turkey/Turkish culture in this way does occur on a local level as 
well. For example, the TCC sponsors a monthly Ladies Coffee Night. 
Anywhere from five to twenty Turkish women and three to fifteen American 
women attend. One coffee night involved showing attendees how to brew 
Turkish coffee. Another featured a local artist who demonstrated Ebru, a 
painting/paper marbling technique prominent in Turkish art, described here 
in Crystal’s field notes:
Fatos explained that the water in the pan that was to be used for Ebru was not 
normal tap water, but special water treated with animal fat so the paint doesn’t 
drop to the bottom, but floats on top of it. She described that the jars full of 
colorful watery paint were made from natural dyes and not chemicals. The 
artist dipped the painting needle in green paint and drew a long, horizontal, 
slightly curved line across the water, like the stem of a flower and its leaves. 
She then dropped dots of yellow and red around the stem for the flowers and 
began to manipulate the dots with the needle. Each time she made a stroke in 
one dot, creating the form of a flower petal.
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Fatos, a female Turk, began to describe the cultural significance and philoso-
phy behind the art. For example, while the artist used equal, dedicated needle 
strokes to create each petal for the flower in her first painting, Fatos explained 
that, “Ebru is about balance and what you do to one, you have to do to all of 
the others.” She also informed participants that religious symbolism is fre-
quently used in Ebru art, which often depicts a rose—symbolizing the Muslim 
prophet Mohammad, who is himself a rose in the desert—and a tulip, which 
represents God.
During Fatos’ presentation, as the artist started a second painting, 
Samantha, an American TCC participant, exclaimed, “It’s like magic every 
time!” Samantha’s sentiment is illustrative of the sometimes-mysterious 
nature of Turkish culture for Americans. Highlighting the beauty of Turkish 
art and describing its symbolism/creation to Americans makes Turkish cul-
ture accessible and facilitates the reconceptualization of the Muslim image in 
their minds. However, unlike Emma’s and Patricia’s reactions to cooking 
classes and henna night—which stress similarity and amount to contiguity 
claims (Berbrier 2002)—Helen’s imaginative relationship with the Turkish 
landscape and Samantha’s experiences with Ebru stresses the beautiful 
strangeness of Turkish culture. While both reactions combat anti-Muslim 
stigma by putting Turkish culture and the secular self on the forefront, they 
also reinforce Orientalism (Said 1979, 1980). Westerners fetishizing Turkish 
culture as “magic” perpetuates the view that Eastern culture(s) are exotic and 
fundamentally different than the West, just as assessing them positively 
because they are similar to Western practices reinforces their inferior hierar-
chical position relative to Western culture.
Normalizing the Muslim Self: American-Prompted Religious 
Dialogue
Evident in displays of Turkish culture as presented above, Turks at the TCC 
draw upon the more innocuous component of their identities, that of their 
nationality, to introduce components of their religious identity. When the 
Turkish ladies offer headscarves as prizes during cooking classes or describe 
the religious significance of traditional Ebru imagery, for example, they are 
seizing an opportunity to introduce Islam/Islamic traditions into the mindset 
of American participants thus commandeering the American participants’ 
newly formed familiarity with Turkish culture as a vehicle for the normaliza-
tion of the Muslim identity while still prioritizing culture over religion. Turks 
at the TCC do not directly confront negative Muslim stereotypes, but rather 
use dialogue to gently correct them. Therefore, a second form of dialogue at 
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the TCC involves creating familiarity through informal conversation. As the 
Ladies’ Coffee Night leader told attendees, “the aim of [Coffee Nights] is to 
promote diversity and encourage ladies from many different cultures to 
gather and have a delightful time while making new friends! [We are] open-
ing our hearts to you and hope to get to know you better.”
This aspect of dialogue is most visible to American participants. As Ann, 
an American woman and frequent TCC participant explained, “a big part of 
[the TCC], is just to have people see who they are, to put aside stereotypes, a 
‘this is what we are, you can ask us anything’ sort of thing.” Frank, an 
American man and former member of the BOD agreed:
That’s why I think that what they are doing [at the TCC] is so great because 
really, fundamentally what they want to do is encourage people to talk to one 
another about where they are in their culture, in their faith and just understand 
each other a little better and that’s why they’re so big on having these meetings 
over meals and all of that.
Turkish TCC participants, aware that informal conversation provides a 
unique opportunity for open-ended dialogue, are deliberate when choosing 
seats at events like the annual dinner or coffee nights. At these events, 
American participants usually sit with whomever they arrived or individuals 
they already know. Non-English-speaking Turkish participants often sit apart 
from the rest of the group. English-speaking Turkish TCC participants, how-
ever, scatter themselves around the room purposefully, ensuring that they are 
with a group of Americans and are optimally available for conversation or 
informal dialogue.
Unlike formal events, which are largely controlled by Turkish participants 
and center on culture, Americans play a bigger role in steering dialogue dur-
ing informal conversation. Turkish participants resist centering their Muslim 
identities, but when Americans prompt dialogue, it most often revolves 
around religious inquiry and their curiosity about Islam. While this provides 
Turks another opportunity to manage stigma, it also means that rather than 
presenting positive images and accepting accolades (as happens with cultural 
education efforts and in informal conversations about culture), they must cor-
rect negative stereotypes. Most frequently, they accomplish this by making 
contiguity claims that demonstrate and emphasize the similarities between 
Islam and Christianity—sending the message “we are like you” (Berbrier 
2002). For example, Gulay, a Turkish woman, said:
A Christian may believe that Muslims really don’t like Jesus at all, but they 
have never heard our point of view about Jesus. And when they hear the story 
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in the Qur’an, for example—we have a special chapter for Marym, Mary in the 
Bible, Marym in Turkish, with her name, just with her name—and we have 
Jesus’ story and her story and all the details in the Qur’an.
She continues, talking about her experiences sharing this information with 
Americans:
When we first shared this with them, then they were amazed that we love Jesus 
like any other Prophet, too. So they might start thinking there must be some 
educated, open-minded, or more conscious Muslims. They know their religion, 
their religion doesn’t teach them to be enemies. They learn that our Qur’an and 
God tell us to love neighbors, too, like Christians say—so they shouldn’t be an 
enemy to us.
Gulay’s example illustrates how direct interfaith dialogue in informal con-
versation about prophets, biblical content, or philosophical beliefs, when 
focused on similarities, can break down Americans’ belief that they should be 
“an enemy to [Turkish Muslims]” and challenge the notion that Muslims or 
Turkish people are inclined toward violence. Other times, interfaith dialogue 
is less about core beliefs or texts, but instead revolves around practices and 
the day-to-day experience of faith. At one coffee night, for example, Maria, 
an American Catholic nun, tugged on the blue cloth covering her head and 
made a comment about her hair always coming out. Yonca, a Turkish woman, 
empathized with Maria’s discomfort and showed her the beige-colored cap 
she wore underneath her colorful headscarf to prevent her hair from being 
seen. She offered to get Maria some caps if she would like. Maria declined 
Yonca’s offer, but after this exchange uncovering similarities in their daily 
experience of religious practice, they began discussing the women of the 
bible.
While Turkish participants often describe differences making people 
“more valuable” to one another, as Yilmaz put it, they usually stress religious 
similarities in these conversations. Here, as with their presentations of 
Turkish culture and the Turkish secular self, they find ways to (as Gulay said) 
“[find] similarities and [talk] about them” so that Americans and Turks will 
be closer and “won’t see each other as enemies.” Again, their efforts amount 
to contiguity claims that happen without Turks making direct “we are like 
you” assertions to Americans (Berbrier 2002). However, “distancing 
claims”—which do involve direct assertions about Turkish Muslims—also 
emerged in conversations about religion (Berbrier 2002). Distancing claims 
are claims aimed at distinguishing nondeviant group members from deviant 
group members by arguing “we are not them.”
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Distancing claims are a common stigma management technique (Barkdull 
et al. 2011) and often co-occur with contiguity claims (Hutchison et al. 2008). 
Some scholars call this the “black sheep effect,” where members of an in-
group attempt to preserve the group’s integrity by degrading, disassociating 
with, and/or making extreme judgments about their noncompliant peers 
(Johns, Schmader, and Lickel 2005; Marques, Yzerbyt, and Leyens 1988). 
Turks at the TCC frequently do this when confronted with negative stereo-
types about Turkish Muslims during religious dialogue with Americans. They 
draw sharp distinctions between “good” and “bad” Muslims. For example, 
Gulay said:
[Americans] ask, “What are those terrorist people doing, why do they do this?” 
And we try to explain that they misunderstand—on purpose maybe—things in 
Qur’an. And when they understand even some Christians may use Bible 
wrongly, there are some Muslim people who use the Qur’an in the wrong way 
too, then they don’t have to [see] every Muslim as [a] terrorist.
During one Annual TCC Dinner, a renowned Turkish author similarly dis-
tanced Turks from the Muslims who executed the 9/11 attacks. He asked the 
audience to consider how Turks might view Americans if the image of a 
whole nation was based on one incident:
As someone in the media, I know, we all know, that the media inevitably 
portrays us as not the nicest people on the other side. The media inevitably 
portrays us actually in the most shocking, the most unacceptable, the most 
disturbing elements of a foreign society, a foreign civilization. In other words, 
here in the U.S., the Muslims who make the news are generally not the nicest 
Muslims in the world. So far the people who say the most unacceptable things 
or do the most shocking things [are the ones who are shown to the world]. But 
millions and millions of Muslims who disagree with [their actions are not given 
a voice]. But let me tell you though, the same dynamic is working on our side 
of the front. In other words, Americans or westerners who make the news on 
our side are not always the nicest [or those who] give the nicest message.
He continued, describing how he did a Google search on Christian leaders in 
the West and that the most frequently cited Christian leader was a Florida man 
who burned the Qur’an. He said though he knew that the majority of Christians 
in the West would disagree with this act, those not familiar with American 
culture might assume all Christians feel this way. He warned his audience to 
push beyond “seeing the most disturbing elements of the other side.”
While Turkish participants prefer an approach to dialogue that involves 
putting culture and secular selfhood at the forefront, when religion arises in 
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informal conversation, it provides them an opportunity to grapple with the 
root of negative Muslim stigmas. As such, Turkish TCC participants pur-
posely remain open to talking about religion when American participants 
bring it up. They typically use this form of dialogue to make indirect contigu-
ity claims about Christianity and Islam. Occasionally, however, elements of 
“new” Orientalism—a view that positions Islam as particularly violent (Alam 
2006; Tuastad 2003)—appear in Turkish/American exchanges about reli-
gion. When this happens, Turks used distancing claims to argue they are not 
like the 9/11 terrorists. As Yonca put it, “Not all Muslims are like those who 
bombed the Twin Towers.”
Islam and (by extension) Turkish culture are subject to negative judgment 
when Americans steer the conversation toward religion. Turkish participants 
responding with distancing and contiguity claims, while buffering TCC 
members from stigmatization and challenging negative stereotypes, maintain 
the broader inequality between the West/Christianity and the East/Islam. 
When making distance claims, Turks
admit and presume the existence of sick, diseased, or violent people [in this 
case, Muslim terrorists] (and imply that they might need to be dealt with via 
mechanisms of social control), but argue that those people are to be found 
elsewhere, far away from “us” [Turks at TCC]. (Berbrier 2002, p. 561)
With contiguity claims, Turks keep intact the inequality between Eastern/
Western religions by maintaining American culture and/or Christianity as the 
standard against which other cultures and religions should be compared 
(Hage 1998; Lentin and Titley 2011). Unlike Turkish culture and Islam, 
American culture and religious traditions are never problematized in this 
framework.
Dialogue Embodied: Gendered Presentation(s) of the Turkish 
Muslim Self
Aside from formal cultural education and informal dialogue, stigma manage-
ment also occurs through Turkish TCC participants’ embodiment of core 
Islamic ideologies, especially as expressed in the teachings of Fethullah 
Gülen: hospitality, generosity, peace, kindness, tolerance, and acceptance. 
Through their mannerisms, demeanor, and speech, Turks at the TCC dispel 
negative stereotypes that suggest Muslims are violent people. They demon-
strate to Americans that Turks, as Gulay says, “love [their] neighbors too.” 
While both men and women engage in cultural education efforts and conver-
sations about religion at TCC, Turkish women play a primary role in this 
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informal, unstated form of “dialogue.” Our field notes are full of commentary 
about Turkish women’s kindness, patience, and accessibility. As Crystal’s 
field notes say about Yonca: “Yonca speaks with such calm and concentra-
tion. It is always a pleasure for me to talk with her,” and “Yonca said all of 
this looking at me, focused despite the bustle around us, with her usual happy 
eyes.” Fatos, a Turkish TCC member, is also featured in Crystal’s field notes. 
Fatos is described as: “A lady who I have grown to respect and appreciate 
very much, [especially] her kind, soft, articulate and polite manner. She 
always seems genuinely interested in everything that anyone has to say.” 
Fatos, an educator by trade, was ever ready to clarify a particular cultural ele-
ment, difference, and/or tradition for Crystal. She often walked Crystal 
through ceremonies, providing detailed explanations of the ingredients in a 
particular Turkish dish, the story behind a religious custom, or a description 
of the symbols evident in Turkish/Muslim art.
For example, in her explanation of an Islamic sacrifice festival’s rituals, 
while describing the meat eaten after the sacrifice, Fatos noticed that Crystal 
did not have meat on her plate. Out of respect and understanding, she ended 
her story:
Fatos began to speak to me about how much she and others loved the meat for 
this festival because it always tasted so fresh and flavorful. Nur also made a 
comment like this as she overheard our conversation. But then Fatos looked at 
my plate and noticed that I had not taken any meat. She asked if I was vegetarian 
and then stopped describing why she liked the meat. I told her I wanted to hear 
about it and requested that she continue.
Fatos did not want to offend Crystal by discussing the meat, the reason for the 
sacrifice, and what the Turks at the TCC seemed to enjoy most about the 
celebration, thus demonstrating both kindness, tolerance, and respect for cul-
tural traditions different from her own. Fatos’ attentiveness to and sensitivity 
toward even the subtlest cultural cues (the contents of Crystal’s plate), is so 
finely tuned that she pushes beyond normal kindness, patience, and willing-
ness to communicate. She exhibited a sense of tolerance and mutual respect 
toward one’s alternative life perspectives that embodies the spirit of 
dialogue.
As these field note excerpts suggest, Turkish women occupy a central role 
in embodying a gendered version of the kind, respectful Muslim self—for 
them, a physical manifestation of dialogue. The same is true for expressions 
of hospitality and generosity—two other ideals Turkish participants empha-
size in their interactions with Americans. Food is one vehicle for this work. 
As Alice once exclaimed, “and food—there’s always food, for every event! 
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(laughing) Even at a committee meeting, we turn around and there’s food on 
the table or a cup of tea!” Indeed, more home cooked Turkish cuisine than 
any group twice the size of those attending could eat appeared at every TCC 
event. Turkish women prepare and serve this food to guests, as Eyup’s field 
notes document:
After the speech, guests, who finished eating their meals, slowly began to leave 
the building. While some of the guests were leaving, Turkish ladies, who 
prepared the meals, started to tidy up the living room. I intended to help the 
ladies to neaten up the living room. When I attempted to help them, one of them 
suggests [that I] drink a cup of tea. She said: “You are a guest, please don’t 
disturb yourself.”
Turks at TCC also express hospitality and generosity through financial 
contributions. This was the one arena where Turkish men’s labor is as visible 
as women’s work. However, here, too, presentations of self that challenge 
Western assumptions about the violent nature of Islam and/or Turkish culture 
are deeply gendered (Alam 2006; Tuastad 2003). Turkish TCC leaders often 
suggest a fee on event flyers or website advertisements, but fees are never 
formally collected or enforced. Instead, Turkish participants finance events 
largely with funds out of their own pockets. As Suleyman, a Turkish male 
participant, explained,
Turks help to organize the activities. For example, Turkish ladies prepare most 
of the food for the activities and they don’t want any money for these 
preparations. [They prepared food with their own means] voluntarily. And for 
the other expenses like the rent of the building of TCC, people who come here 
donate. I donate too.
Suleyman’s comments reflect how Turkish men disproportionately fund 
core TCC needs such as rent/utilities and TCC events. Their structural posi-
tion (Turkish men at TCC are more likely than Turkish women to earn wages, 
have access to money, and/or to control family funds) positions them to be 
capable of this sort of generosity in a way most women are not. However, 
women, as Suleyman indicated when he said they “prepare most of the food 
for the activities” and do not want compensation for it, still play a primary 
role in embodying a gendered version of the generous Turkish Muslim self. 
They do this for TCC and for other local organizations. For example, TCC’s 
annual fundraiser features homemade food for sale, Turkish goods like rugs 
and clothes, and a garage sale with items mostly donated by the Turks them-
selves. Profits go to a local cause—most recently, a local elementary school. 
As Selim described it:
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The ladies put their own effort and time in preparing all those dishes, and they 
get a small fee from the people who are attending [the cooking classes], and 
they actually had some extras, profit, and with that profit they bought the 
ingredients for the food, which they sold at the event. I think it is a great sense 
of entrepreneurship, social responsibility. And half of the money—or maybe 
more than half—was donated to the school, which is in need. So it is not a big 
amount, but at the end of the day you do something for the society.
Personal contributions to the local community such as these align with the 
importance that Gülen followers place on hospitality and generosity as core 
Muslim values, particularly in relation to interpersonal interactions as well as 
open support of educational institutions (via their financial support of a local 
school). Moreover, these contributions—primarily made by Turkish 
women—illustrate to Americans that Turks do not embody the negative ste-
reotypes that suggest Muslims hate America or the West. To the contrary, 
their generosity toward schools and organizations in their city illustrates that 
they are active, responsible community members.
Turkish women’s embodiment of Muslim ideals like patience, tolerance, 
and generosity often extends outside the community center in this manner, as 
Gulay’s comments suggest:
Through [TCC] we have been meeting a lot [of American friends]. I [tell them] 
if they need anything, if they have a party, we want to cook for them, to help. If 
someone invites me, I try to take a plate, too, because I know she will be tired. 
We started to take care of each other, too. I mean, I invite them to my house 
then they invite us to their house and they ask about the kids, how they are 
doing. They even met my father and mother. We even visited their church [and] 
attended their holiday prayer.
Similarly extending her generosity beyond the confines of TCC, Fatma, a 
female Turk, frequently offered Crystal rides to events. When Crystal offered 
to provide Fatma compensation for the rides, Fatma refused:
At this point we stopped for gas down the street from [Crystal’s] apartment and 
I offered to chip in for gas money and she sternly, but half-jokingly stated, 
“Don’t offer that. If you do, I’ll get mad.”
Crystal and Eyup’s experiences with the generosity of Turks—especially 
Turkish women—at TCC are typical of American participants. Frank’s com-
ments illustrate how many felt about it:
The hospitality—it’s not just the going into the homes [of the Turks] that’s a big 
deal, but it’s the feeling that you are like visiting royalty in this home, and they 
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treat you so well when you come. You just feel like an honored guest from 
beginning to end and that the thing that people enjoy so much is how well they 
are treated. If you wanted to talk about books, that’s great too. If you want to 
go to Turkey with them, that’s great. They are just—they’re very good about 
finding your comfort level for engaging with them and not pushing you beyond 
that. Just letting you find your way into their world and into that friendship.
Americans who are exposed to Turks’ embodied presentations of a peace-
ful, generous, respectful, and hospitable Turkish/Muslim self feel like “visit-
ing royalty” whose “comfort level” is respected and whose friendship is 
sought. Turks’ gendered embodiment of Muslim ideals tacitly fosters dia-
logue and helps deconstruct the image of Muslims and/or Turks as hostile, 
angry, or violent people (Alam 2006; Tuastad 2003). As we saw when dia-
logue took the form of cultural education and informal conversation about 
religion, most of this work is done without Turks ever making direct asser-
tions. Just like exposure to Turkish culture leads Americans to see the conti-
guity between Turks and themselves, exposure to Turkish women’s embodied 
presentations of self lead Americans to see the distance between Turks at the 
TCC and the “black sheep” they might otherwise be associated with (i.e. ter-
rorists/extremists; Berbrier 2002; Marques, Yzerbyt, and Leyens 1988). This 
approach, like many other projects that attempt to bring Eastern cultures into 
dialogue with the West, feminizes Turkish culture, customs, and/or Muslim 
religious traditions (Maira 2008; Yan and Santos 2009), in order to make 
them more palatable and safer for American audiences. While performances 
of respect, peacefulness, and generosity work to challenge anti-Muslim 
stigma, they simultaneously reproduce longstanding stereotypes of Muslim 
women as passive victims of strict Muslim gender regimes (Lentin and Titley 
2011; Saloom 2005).
Discussion and Conclusion
As members of the Gülen movement, Turkish men and women at the TCC 
manage stigma and challenge negative stereotypes about Muslims through 
the practice of dialogue. Embedded in formal cultural education efforts; inti-
mate conversations about religion; and in gendered presentation(s) of self, 
dialogue allows Turks to make contiguity claims that stress their similarity to 
Americans and/or Christians and distancing claims that stress their dissimi-
larity from terrorists/extremists (Berbrier 2002). When Turkish TCC partici-
pants engage in dialogue through cultural education—a process they control 
and use to emphasize the secular Turkish self—they cultivate a familiarity 
with Turkish culture that leads many Americans to conclude “they are like 
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us.” In informal conversation, Turks dispel Americans’ negative Muslim ste-
reotypes by stressing the similarities between Christianity and Islam or dis-
tancing themselves from their “black sheep” brethren: 9/11 offenders. When 
engaging in dialogue as an embodied presentation, Turks at the TCC help 
Americans see the distance between themselves (“good”) and “bad” (violent/
extremist) Muslims by feminizing the Muslim self.
Our ethnographic study of the TCC allowed us to examine the socially 
embedded nature of stigmatization processes (Collins 2004; Corrigan and 
Watson 2002), where “specific norms and expectations” in a microsocial 
institutional context shape how stigmatized groups experience and handle 
stigmatization (Barreto and Ellemers 2010, p. 435). We identify three factors 
that explain the shape and effectiveness of stigma management at the TCC. 
First, working collectively in an institutional space that is controlled by Turks 
makes adopting dialogue as a primary and uniform stigma management prac-
tice possible. Past research suggests that group-based strategies like this are 
effective for resilience in the face of stigmatization (Barkdull et al. 2011; 
O’Brien 2011; Umbreit Lewis, and Burns 2003) and that they provide impor-
tant self-protective benefits to individuals managing stigma (Crabtree et al. 
2010; Leach et al. 2010; Valenta 2009). Second, the social and cultural back-
ground of Muslims at the TCC (as Turks and followers of Gülen) explains 
their embracing dialogue and prioritizing secular rather than religious iden-
tity (A. Kaya 2010; Turam 2004). Our work suggests this is a strategy 
Americans find more palatable than those involving stronger identification 
with Islam, which run the risk of incurring further stigmatization because 
Muslims are perceived as resisting assimilation (Barkdull et al. 2011; 
Klandermans, van der Toorn, and van Stekelenburg 2008). Finally, gender 
norms shape participants’ embodiment of the peaceful/generous Turkish/
Muslim self at the TCC. Feminizing Islam and/or Eastern cultures is appeal-
ing to Western audiences (Yan and Santos 2009). Our work suggests this 
practice can therefore facilitate stigma management.
In addition to examining the contextual norms and expectations that 
explain Turks’ use of dialogue to manage stigma, we also contribute to recent 
stigmatization research on social structural influences by using critical race 
theory to interrogate the “power situations” that contextual norms and expec-
tations unfold in (Barreto and Ellemers 2010; Scambler 2006). At first glance, 
Turks’ efforts to challenge and resist stigmatization could be seen as an 
attempt at stigma transformation (Pfuhl 1993)—a process whereby groups 
use “moral entrepreneurship strategies” to change the meaning of a deviant 
label, which has broad consequences for reframing how society sees a stig-
matized group (Becker 1963; Berbrier 2002). After all, Turks at the TCC 
utilize a “home culture” frame: one they (the stigmatized group, in this case 
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Turks at the TCC) developed in response to negative stereotypes and which 
contains positive, affirming messages about their culture (Feagin 2009). In 
addition, especially as followers of Gülen, they see their efforts as part of a 
larger social movement that will fundamentally transform the way Americans 
perceive Islam (Ebaugh 2010).
Upon closer examination, however, it is clear that while TCC Turks’ use 
of dialogue helps them personally manage stigma and helps deconstruct neg-
ative images of Muslims and Turks in the minds of Americans at the center 
itself, it simultaneously perpetuates broader patterns of racial/ethnic and gen-
der inequality. Stigmatized groups’ psychological orientations to the self 
have historically been connected to the way they are viewed in mainstream 
(i.e. white) America (Du Bois 1903; Fanon 1967). Turks at the TCC are no 
exception. Their presentations of self—especially because they are aimed at 
an American audience—continually engage with Orientalist views of Islam 
and the East. When Turks at TCC make claims such as “we are like you” or 
“we are not those Muslims” and when they use a feminized version of the 
Turkish self to challenge stigma, they frame themselves as exceptions to the 
rule: more peaceful, more kind, more normal or “like you” than Muslim 
extremists. This leaves the general stereotype of Muslims as violent extrem-
ists intact, however. It also perpetuates stereotypes of Muslim women as pas-
sive victims of extreme gender regimes and reinforces the West/Christianity 
as the standard against which other cultures/religions should be assessed 
(Said 1979, 1980). In other words, rather than deconstructing the “deviant 
cultural space” that Muslims occupy in the United States, Turkish TCC par-
ticipants’ stigma management practices do not question the existence or legit-
imacy of that space, but merely challenge their placement within it (Berbrier 
2002, p. 561).
This is similar to what Crenshaw (2011, p. 1332) calls “post-racial prag-
matism,” or “an adjustment to and negotiation within existing power while 
ensuring that such power remains unmarked.” Others call strategies like 
those we observed at TCC “self-Orientalism” (Yan and Santos 2009) or “self-
exoticism” (Shay and Sellers-Young 2003). Our work suggests these strate-
gies are intimately tied to the social structural positions that the people and 
groups who utilize them occupy. Turks at TCC are relatively privileged by 
comparison to poorer or more marginalized Muslims and/or Turkish people 
in the United States. Their relatively secure class status makes it easier to 
view cultural ignorance or lack of “knowing each other” as the core cause of 
stigma—a view scholars would argue blankets the structural forces influenc-
ing the development/perpetuation of stigma that cannot be easily resolved 
through interpersonal communication (Goffman 1963; Scambler 2006). 
Rather than openly discuss the long history of unequal race/ethnic relations 
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between the East and the West, Islam and Christianity, or Turks and 
Americans, the strategies employed by Turks at the TCC engage with exist-
ing inequalities as baggage ready to be abandoned and moved beyond. 
Though our analysis reveals that it is clearly steeped in inequality between 
the two groups, the “dialogue” strategy positions Turks and Americans as 
though they are (or can be) equal partners in open exchange, intimate com-
munication, and friendship. The work Turks do at the TCC, while on the face 
seeming like a move toward equality and acceptance, actually involves using 
“dissociative gestures” to communicate lack of threat to existing Western/
white/American power structures (Crenshaw 2011, p. 1321).
While we identify specific strategies that work well for personally buff-
ering individual members of stigmatized groups against some of the nega-
tive consequences of stigmatization, examine the contextual norms that 
fuel those strategies, and interrogate the role power dynamics play in the 
development and perpetuation of stigma, this study has important limita-
tions. First, one of the reasons TCC’s strategies are successful is selection 
bias. Many of the Americans who attend events at the center are more 
receptive to both Turkish and Muslim culture than others might be. Many 
American participants openly admit that they fostered an interest in Turkish 
culture and an open mindedness toward learning about Islam. What leads 
some individuals to accept invitations to TCC and whether or not the strate-
gies used at TCC to dispel stereotypes and manage Muslim stigmatization 
would work with other people who are not similarly inclined deserves fur-
ther investigation.
Additional future research utilizing an intersectionality approach would 
also greatly benefit our understanding of stigma management, especially 
among Muslim groups and individuals. Studies clearly reveal that status posi-
tions such as race, class, gender, nation, and sexuality affect how groups 
experience stigmatization processes. As our analysis reveals, particular 
aspects of Turkish culture (i.e. emphasis on secular identity), the financially 
stable class position of Turks at TCC, and traditional gender norms that femi-
nize Islam position them well for managing stigma. Other works elucidate 
how the Black Muslim experience in America, for example, is different than 
African Muslims’ experience with discrimination and stereotyping (Abdullah 
2009; Barzegar 2011) or how gender norms (e.g. wearing the hijab) put 
Muslim women at increased risk for ill treatment at the hands of non-Muslim 
Americans (Barkdull et al. 2011; Endelstein and Ryan 2013). Adopting an 
intersectional lens would allow researchers to see the multifaceted ways in 
which social experiences unfold based upon differential status positions—
even within groups that outsiders see as uniformly “other”—and how those 
variant experiences are tied to stigma management strategies.
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Finally, while our work indicates that contextual factors (e.g., an institu-
tional context managed by Turks), aspects of Turkish culture (e.g., prioritiza-
tion of secular identity), and gendered strategies (the presentation of a 
generous, hospitable, and peaceful self) facilitate stigma management for indi-
viduals, these strategies also reinforce longstanding patterns in Western views 
of the East (Said 1979, 1980; Yan and Santos 2009). Post-Orientalist and/or 
feminist scholarship has criticized exoticized, reductive representations of 
Eastern people/traditions, especially of Oriental and/or Muslim women 
(Saloom 2005). Our work suggests that stigma management practices are not 
necessarily a space for such critical analysis of institutional racism embedded 
in Western culture. Essentially, “Anything said in defense of Islam is more or 
less forced into the apologetic form of a plea for Islam’s humanism, its contri-
butions to civilization, development, and perhaps even to democratic nice-
ness”—elements we clearly see in Turks’ dialogue-based stigma management 
strategies at TCC (Said 1980, p. 488). Future studies might investigate stigma 
management strategies among less privileged Turks or Muslims and/or the 
employment of strategies that do not so easily “conform to Orientalist dis-
course” or create and sustain impressions of Muslims/Turks that remain “sub-
jugated to Western understanding” (Yan and Santos 2009, p. 295).
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Notes
1. We have changed the name of the community center and all participants in order 
to preserve confidentiality.
2. Perhaps due to Gülen-related political turmoil in Turkey (for an example, see 
Arango 2013) or additional unwanted stigma due to their association with 
Gülen, Turks at the TCC were not forthcoming about their affiliation with the 
movement. We became aware of the TCC’s relationship with the Hizmet/Gülen 
Movement only because one of the researchers is Turkish and easily identified 
the association and because an American TCC participant openly discussed it 
with the Crystal. When asked about their association with Gülen, Turkish TCC 
participants evaded questions or redirected conversations. One participant ques-
tioned our motivations for even broaching the subject. In order to remain in good 
standing at the TCC, we therefore did not push participants to further discuss 
their affiliation with Gülen.
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3. Figure includes one Moroccan Muslim woman and one American Muslim 
woman.
4. Figure includes one white American Muslim man.
5. The division between citizenship and religious status is not simple. Only a few 
Turks at the TCC are American citizens and, as our membership statistics indi-
cate, at least two Muslims at the TCC are white Americans. However, because 
these instances are rare, for the sake of ease, from this point on we distinguish 
between Turks and Americans as the primary demographic division.
6. We use the identifiers “Turkish” and “Muslim” interchangeably in our analy-
sis. Although we and the TCC participants recognize the difference between 
national and religious identity, TCC participants frequently wed the two so 
that they are indistinguishable from one another—something that we argue 
aids in stigma management. We therefore occasionally use the two identifiers 
interchangeably.
Works Cited
Abadan-Unat, Nermin. 1995. Turkish migration to Europe. In The Cambridge survey 
of world migration, edited by Robin Cohen. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 279–84.
Abdullah, Zain. 2009. African “soul brothers” in the ’hood: Immigration, Islam, and 
the Black encounter. Anthropological Quarterly 82 (1): 37–62.
Abu-Raiya, Hisham, Kenneth I. Pargament, and Annette Mahoney 2011. Examining 
coping methods with stressful interpersonal events experienced by Muslims liv-
ing in the United States following the 9/11 attacks. Psychology of Religion and 
Spirituality 3 (1): 1–14.
Alam, M. Shahid. 2006. Challenging the new Orientalism: Dissenting essays on the 
“War against Islam.” North Haledon, NJ: Islamic Publications International.
Ali, Wajahat, Eli Clifton, Matthew Duss, Lee Fang, Scott Keyes, and Faiz Shakir. 
2011. “Fear, Inc.” The roots of the Islamophobia network in America. 
Washington, DC: Center for American Progress.
Allison, Katherine. 2013. American Occidentalism and the agential Muslim woman. 
Review of International Studies 39 (03): 665–84.
Arango, Tim. 2013, December 18. Raids and graft inquiry in Turkey are seen by some 
as Muslim cleric’s plot. The New York Times A20.
Ayers, John W. 2007. Changing sides: 9/11 and the American Muslim voter. Review 
of Religious Research 49 (2): 187–98.
Ayoub, Mahmoud. 2011. 9/11 and the need for a new paradigm for interfaith dia-
logue. The Muslim World 101 (3): 562–64.
Barkdull, Carenlee, Khadija Khaja, Irene Queiro-Tajalli, Amy Swart, Diane 
Cunningham, and Sheila Dennis. 2011. Experiences of Muslims in four Western 
countries post—9/11. Affilia 26 (2): 139–53.
Barreto, Manuela, and Ellemers, Naomi. 2010. Current issues in the study of social 
stigma: Some controversies and unresolved issues. Journal of Social Issues 66 
(3): 431–45.
Paul and Becker 167
Barzegar, Abbas. 2011. Discourse, identity, and community: Problems and prospects 
in the study of Islam in America. Muslim World 101 (3): 511–38.
BBC World News. 2013, December 18. Profile: Fethullah Gulen’s Hizmet move-
ment. Retrieved December 2, 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-13503361.
Becker, Howard S. 1963. Outsiders: Studies in the sociology of deviance. New York: 
Free Press.
Belgrave, Linda Liska, and Keruleth J. Smith. 1995. Negotiated validity in collabora-
tive ethnography. Qualitative Inquiry 1 (1): 69–86.
Berbrier, Mitch. 2002. Making minorities: Cultural space, stigma transformation 
frames, and the categorical status claims of deaf, gay, and white suprema-
cist activists in late twentieth century America. Sociological Forum 17 (4): 
553–91.
Bleich, Erik. 2009. Muslims and the state in the post-9/11 West: Introduction. Journal 
of Ethnic and Migration Studies 35 (3): 353–60.
Bohm, David. 2004. On dialogue, second edition. New York: Routledge.
Bonet, Sally Wesley. 2011. Educating Muslim American youth in a post-9/11 era: A 
critical review of policy and practice. High School Journal 95 (1): 46–55.
Bonilla-Silva, Eduardo. 2010. Racism without racists, third edition. Lanham, MD: 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.
Brennan, Sue. 2011. Time, space, and national belonging in The Namesake: 
Redrawing South Asian American citizenship in the shadow of 9/11. Journal of 
Transnational American Studies 3 (1).
Cainkar, Louise. 2009. Homeland insecurity: The Arab American and Muslim 
American experience after 9/11. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Carr, Deborah, and Michael A. Friedman. 2005. Is obesity stigmatizing? Body 
weight, perceived discrimination, and psychological well-being in the United 
States. Journal of Health and Social Behavior 46 (3): 244–59.
Central Intelligence Agency. 2014. The world factbook: Middle East, Turkey. 
Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency.
Charmaz, Kathy. 2006. Constructing grounded theory: A practical guide through 
qualitative analysis. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.
Chou, Rosalind S., and Joe R. Feagin. 2008. The myth of the model minority: Asian 
Americans facing racism. Boulder: Paradigm Publishers.
Clarke, Adele E. 2005. Situational analysis: Grounded theory after the postmodern 
turn. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Collins, Patricia Hill. 2004. Black sexual politics: African Americans, gender, and the 
new racism. New York: Routledge.
Corrigan, Patrick W., and Amy C. Watson. 2002. The paradox of self-stigma and 
mental illness. Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice, 9 (1): 35–53.
Crabtree, Jason W., S. Alexander Haslam, Tom Postmes, and Catherine Haslam. 
2010. Mental health support groups, stigma, and self-esteem: Positive and nega-
tive implications of group identification. Journal of Social Issues, 66 (3): 553–69.
Crenshaw, Kimberlé. 1991. Mapping the margins: Intersectionality, identity politics, 
and violence against women of color. Stanford Law Review 43 (6): 1241–99.
168 Journal of Contemporary Ethnography 46(2)
Crenshaw, Kimberlé Williams. 2011. Twenty years of critical race theory: Looking 
back to move forward. Connecticut Law Review 43 (5), 1253–1352.
Dixon, Nancy. M. 1996. Perspectives on dialogue: Making talk developmental for 
individuals and organizations. Greensboro, NC: Center for Creative Leadership.
Du Bois, W. E. B. 1903. The souls of black folk. Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co.
Duster, Troy. 2003. Buried alive: The concept of race in science. In Genetic nature/
culture: Anthropology and science beyond the two-culture divide. Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press.
Ebaugh, Helen Rose. 2010. The Gülen movement: A sociological analysis of a civic 
movement rooted in moderate Islam. New York: Springer.
el-Aswad, el-Sayed. (2013). Images of Muslims in Western scholarship and media 
after 9/11. Digest of Middle East Studies 22 (1): 39–56.
Endelstein, Lucine, and Louise Ryan. 2013. Dressing religious bodies in public spaces: 
Gender, clothing and negotiations of stigma among Jews in Paris and Muslims in 
London. Integrative Psychological & Behavioral Science 47 (2): 249–64.
Esterberg, Kristin G. 2002. Qualitative Methods in Social Research. New York: 
McGraw-Hill Higher Education.
Fanon, Frantz. 1967. Black skin, white masks. New York: Grove Press.
Feagin, Joe R. 2009. The white racial frame: Centuries of racial framing and counter-
framing, first edition. New York: Routledge.
Feagin, Joe R. 2013. Systemic racism: A theory of oppression. New York: Routledge.
Fernández, Gastón A. (2007). Race, gender, and class in the persistence of the Mariel 
stigma twenty years after the exodus from Cuba. International Migration Review 
41 (3): 602–22.
Fink, Paul Jay, and Allan Tasman. (1992). Stigma and mental illness. Arlington, VA: 
American Psychiatric Publishing.
Gallup, Inc. 2009. Religious perceptions in America with an in-depth analysis of U.S. 
attitudes toward Muslims and Islam. Washington, DC: Gallup, Inc.
Garland, David. 2001. The culture of control: crime and social order in contemporary 
society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Ghumman, Sonia, and Linda Jackson. 2010. The downside of religious attire: 
The Muslim headscarf and expectations of obtaining employment. Journal of 
Organizational Behavior 31 (1): 4–23.
Goffman, Erving. 1963. Stigma: Notes on the management of spoiled identity. New 
York: Simon and Schuster.
Göle, Nilüfer. 2003. The voluntary adoption of Islamic stigma symbols. Social 
Research: An International Quarterly 70 (3): 809–28.
Gülen, M. Fethullah. 2004. The necessity of interfaith dialogue: A Muslim perspec-
tive. Clifton, NJ: The Light, Inc.
Güler, Müzeyyen. 2006. Turkish immigrants in the United States: Men, women and 
children. International Journal of Turkish Studies 12 (1–2): 145–65.
Hage, Ghassan. 1998. White nation: Fantasies of white supremacy in a multicultural 
nation. New York: Routledge.
Herek, Gregory M. (1998). Stigma and sexual orientation: Understanding prejudice 
against lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Paul and Becker 169
Herek, Gregory M., Sona Saha, and Jeffrey Burack. 2013. Stigma and psychological 
distress in people with HIV/AIDS. Basic and Applied Social Psychology 35 (1): 
41–54.
Hewitt, Jay, and Mushubab A. Alqahtani. 2003. Differences between Saudi and U.S. 
students in reaction to same- and mixed-sex intimacy shown by others. The 
Journal of Social Psychology 143 (2): 233–42.
Howarth, Caroline. 2006. Race as stigma: Positioning the stigmatized as agents, 
not objects. Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology 16 (6): 
442–51.
Hutchison, Paul, Dominic Abrams, Roberto Gutierrez, and G. Tendayi Viki. 2008. 
Getting rid of the bad ones: The relationship between group identification, 
deviant derogation, and identity maintenance. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology 44 (3): 874–81.
Ibrahim, Yasmin. (2007). 9/11 as a new temporal phase for Islam: The narrative 
and temporal framing of Islam in crisis. Contemporary Islam 1 (1): 37–51. 
doi:10.1007/s11562-007-0007-x
Johns, Michael, Toni Schmader, and Brian Lickel. 2005. Ashamed to be an American? 
The role of identification in predicting vicarious shame for anti-Arab prejudice 
after 9–11. Self and Identity 4 (4): 331–48.
Kalkan, Kerem Ozan, Geoffrey C. Layman, and Erik M. Uslaner. 2009. “Bands of 
others”? Attitudes toward Muslims in contemporary American Society. The 
Journal of Politics 71 (03): 847–62.
Kaya, Ayhan. 2010. Individualization and institutionalization of Islam in Europe in 
the age of securitization. Insight Turkey 12 (1).
Kaya, Ilhan. 2004. Turkish-American immigration history and identity formations. 
Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 24 (2): 295–308.
Kendall, Diana. 2002. The power of good deeds: Privileged women and the social 
reproduction of the upper class. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Khalid, Salma. (2007). Counselling from an Islamic perspective. Therapy Today, 
18:34–37.
Klandermans, Bert, Jojanneke van der Toorn, and Jacquelien van Stekelenburg. 
2008. Embeddedness and identity: How immigrants turn grievances into action. 
American Sociological Review, 73 (6): 992–1012.
Kleck, Robert. 1968. Physical stigma and nonverbal cues emitted in face-to-face 
interaction. Human Relations 21 (1): 19–28.
Küçükcan, Talip. 2004. The making of Turkish-Muslim diaspora in Britain: Religious 
collective identity in a multicultural public sphere. Journal of Muslim Minority 
Affairs 24 (2): 243–58.
Kurucan, Ahmet, and Mustafa Kasim Erol. 2012. Dialogue in Islam: Qur’an • Sunnah 
• History. London: Dialogue Society.
Lassiter, Luke Eric. 2005. Collaborative ethnography and public anthropology. 
Current Anthropology 46 (1): 83–106.
Leach, Colin Wayne, Patricia M. Rodriguez Mosquera, Michael L. W. Vliek, and 
Emily Hirt. 2010. Group devaluation and group identification. Journal of Social 
Issues 66 (3): 535–52.
170 Journal of Contemporary Ethnography 46(2)
Lenhardt, R. A. 2004. Understanding the mark: Race, stigma, and equality in context. 
New York University Law Review 79:803–931.
Lentin, Alana, and Gavan Titley. 2011. The crises of multiculturalism: Racism in a 
neoliberal age. London: Zed Books.
Lentin, Alana, and Gavan Titley. 2012. The crisis of “multiculturalism” in Europe: 
Mediated minarets, intolerable subjects. European Journal of Cultural Studies 
15 (2): 123–38.
Link, Bruce G., and Jo C. Phelan. 2001. Conceptualizing stigma. Annual Review of 
Sociology 27 (1): 363–85.
Lohmann, Roger A., and Jon Van Til, eds. 2011. Resolving community conflicts and 
problems: Public deliberation and sustained dialogue. Columbia University 
Press.
Maira, Sunaina. 2008. Belly dancing: Arab-face, Orientalist feminism, and U.S. 
empire. American Quarterly, 60 (2): 317–45.
Marques, José M., Vincent Y. Yzerbyt, and Jacques-Philippe Leyens. 1988. The 
“black sheep effect”: Extremity of judgments towards ingroup members as a 
function of group identification. European Journal of Social Psychology 18 (1): 
1–16.
Marvasti, Amir. 2005. Being Middle Eastern American: Identity Negotiation in the 
Context of the War on Terror. Symbolic Interaction 28 (4): 525–47.
May, Reuben A. Buford, and Mary Patillo-McCoy. 2000. Do you see what I see? 
Examining a collaborative ethnography. Qualitative Inquiry 6 (1): 65–87.
Mir, Shabana. 2011. “Just to make sure people know I was born here”: Muslim 
women constructing American selves. Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics 
of Education 32 (4): 547–63.
Nee, Victor, and Jimy Sanders. 2001. Understanding the diversity of immigrant incor-
poration: a forms-of-capital model. Ethnic and Racial Studies 24 (3): 386–411.
O’Brien, John. 2011. Spoiled group identities and backstage work: A theory of stigma 
management rehearsals. Social Psychology Quarterly 74 (3): 291–309.
Panagopoulos, Costas. 2006. The polls-trends Arab and Muslim Americans and Islam 
in the aftermath of 9/11. Public Opinion Quarterly 70 (4): 608–24.
Parker, Richard, and Peter Aggleton. 2003. HIV and AIDS-related stigma and dis-
crimination: A conceptual framework and implications for action. Social Science 
& Medicine 57 (1): 13–24.
Patel, Tina Girishbhai. 2012. Surveillance, suspicion and stigma: Brown bodies in a 
terror-panic climate. Surveillance & Society 10 (3/4): 215–34.
Pew Research Center. 2014. Religion & Public Life Project. Retrieved June 2014. 
http://www.pewforum.org/2014/09/22/section-1-religion-in-public-life/
Pfuhl, Erdwin H. 1993. The Deviance Process, third edition. New York: Aldine 
Transaction.
Puhl, Rebecca M., and Kelly D. Brownell. 2006. Confronting and coping with weight 
stigma: An investigation of overweight and obese adults. Obesity 14 (10): 
1802–15.
Rappaport, Joanne. 2008. Beyond participant observation: Collaborative ethnography 
as theoretical innovation. Collaborative Anthropologies 1:1–31.
Paul and Becker 171
Rippy, Alyssa E., and Elana Newman. 2006. Perceived religious discrimination and 
its relationship to anxiety and paranoia among Muslim Americans. Journal of 
Muslim Mental Health 1 (1): 5–20.
Rubenstein, William B. 2004. The real story of U.S. hate crimes statistics: An empiri-
cal analysis. Tulane Law Review 78:1213–46.
Runneymede Trust. 1997. Islamophobia: A challenge for us all. London: Runnymede 
Trust Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia.
Ryan, Louise. 2011. Muslim women negotiating collective stigmatization: “We’re 
just normal people.” Sociology 45 (6): 1045–60.
Said, Edward W. 1979. Orientalism, first Vintage Books edition. New York: Vintage.
Said, Edward W. 1980. Islam through Western eyes. Nation 230 (16): 488.
Saito, Natsu Taylor. 2001. Symbolism under siege: Japanese American redress and 
the “racing” of Arab Americans as “terrorists.” Asian Law Journal 8 (1): 1–29.
Saloom, Rachel. 2005. I know you are, but what am I? Arab-American experiences 
through the critical race theory lens. Hamline Journal of Public Law & Policy 
27:55.
Saunders, Harold H., and Priya Narayan Parker. 2011. Sustained dialogue in action. In 
Resolving community conflicts and problems: Public deliberation and sustained 
dialogue, edited by Roger A. Lohmann and Jon Van Til. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 43–60.
Scambler, Graham. 2006. Sociology, social structure and health-related stigma. 
Psychology, Health & Medicine, 11 (3): 288–95.
Scambler, Graham. 2009. Health-related stigma. Sociology of Health & Illness, 31 
(3): 441–55.
Senge, Peter M. 1999. The fifth discipline: The art & practice of the learning organi-
zation. New York: Random House.
Shay, Anthony, and Barbara Sellers-Young. 2003. Belly dance: Orientalism—
Exoticism—Self-Exoticism. Dance Research Journal 35(1).
Sirin, Selcuk R., and Aida B. Balsano. 2007. Editors’ introduction: Pathways to 
identity and positive development among Muslim youth in the West. Applied 
Developmental Science 11 (3): 109–11.
Storrs, Debbie. 1999. Whiteness as stigma: Essentialist identity work by mixed-race 
women. Symbolic Interaction 22 (3): 187–212.
Tuastad, Dag. 2003. Neo-Orientalism and the new barbarism thesis: Aspects of sym-
bolic violence in the Middle East conflict(s). Third World Quarterly 24 (4): 
591–99.
Turam, Berna. 2004. A bargain between the secular state and Turkish Islam: Politics 
of ethnicity in Central Asia. Nations and Nationalism 10 (3): 353–74.
Umbreit, Mark S., Ted Lewis, and Heather Burns. 2003. A community response to 
a 9/11 hate crime: Restorative justice through dialogue. Contemporary Justice 
Review 6 (4): 383–91.
United States Census Bureau. 2010. State and Country QuickFacts. Retrieved June 
2014. http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/index.html
Valenta, Marko. 2009. Immigrants’ identity negotiations and coping with stigma in 
different relational frames. Symbolic Interaction, 32 (4): 351–71.
172 Journal of Contemporary Ethnography 46(2)
Van Til, Jon. 2011. The structure of sustained dialogue and public deliberation. In 
Resolving community conflicts and problems: Public deliberation and sustained 
dialogue. New York: Columbia University Press, 15–32.
Wacquant, Loïc. 2010. Crafting the neoliberal state: Workfare, prisonfare, and social 
insecurity. Sociological Forum 25 (2): 197–220.
Yan, Grace, and Carla A. Santos. (2009). “CHINA, FOREVER”: Tourism discourse 
and self-Orientalism. Annals of Tourism Research 36 (2): 295–315.
Author Biographies
Crystal Paul is a graduate student in Sociology at Louisiana State University. Her 
current research focuses on Latino immigration and the intersection of gender and 
race.
Sarah Becker is an assistant professor of Sociology and Women’s and Gender 
Studies at Louisiana State University. Her primary research interests include the eth-
nographic study of community-based reactions to crime/disorder and the relationship 
between social status (gender/race/class/age) and criminal offending/victimization.
